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This paper extends the previous literature on optimal redistributive taxation in the
presence of externalities to a multi-externality setting. While taxes on income and on
’clean’ commodities are still una￿ected by the externalities, which con￿rms previous
results, I ￿nd that the existence of more than one externality-generating commodity has
important implications for the optimal Pigouvian tax rates. In general the Pigouvian
parts of taxation depend also on the externalities induced by the consumption of the
other commodities, implying that the interdependence of the externality-generating
commodities is relevant for tax policy.
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The main contribution of this note is to extend the literature on optimal redistributive taxation in
the presence of externalities (e.g. Pirttil￿ and Tuomala 1997, Cremer et al. 1998, Kopczuk 2003,
Micheletto 2008) to a multi-externality setting. One important result from this literature is that
the ’additivity property’, ￿rst discovered by Sandmo (1975), also holds in a more general model of
the Mirleesian type.1 The additivity property consists of two components. First, the presence of
an externality only a￿ects the tax rate on that particular good (which generates the externality).
Second, the internalizing part of taxation enters the tax formula additively. This result is quite
remarkable and has important policy implications as it states that an externality is best addressed
by taxing directly that particular good, while the rest of the tax system should remain una￿ected
by the externality.
However, one important shortcoming of the previous literature is the assumption that there is
only one externality-generating commodity. But in reality the consumption of many commodities
causes externalities. Thus, the aim of this note is to generalize the optimal tax problem (income
and commodity taxes) to a multi-externality framework and to clarify the optimal tax structure
in such a context. I show that the ’additivity property’ remains valid with respect to the income
tax and also with respect to the taxes on the non-externality generating goods, as they still remain
una￿ected by the externalities. However, I ￿nd that in general a tax on an externality-generating
commodity also depends on the externalities induced by the consumption of the other commodities,
which violates the ’additivity property’. If the level of an externality increases (decreases) the
demand for another externality-generating commodity this is an additional argument to increase
(decrease) the tax rate on that commodity. Thus, such interdependences between the externality-
generating commodities should be taken into account when designing optimal Pigouvian tax rates.
Applications where this interdependence of the externalities might be of particular relevance include
alcohol and cigarette consumption or car and gasoline consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 presents the
main results on the optimal tax structure. Finally, section 4 concludes. The derivations of the
main results are provided in the Appendix.
1However, Micheletto (2008) has shown that for this result to be valid it is essential that di￿erent types are equally
e￿ective as externality generating units, which is the case if the externality is of the ’atmospheric’ type, meaning
that the externality is created by the total consumption of a good.
22 The model
Consider an economy consisting of two types of individuals i = L;H, who di￿er in earning ability
!L < !H. The size of the population is normalized to one and i represents the fraction of
individuals of type i. Individuals provide labor supply li and earn gross income zi = !ili. As is
common in the optimal taxation literature (e.g. Mirrlees, 1971) the tax administration can only
observe gross income zi, while earning abilities and working time of an individual i are assumed
to be private information. Gross income is subject to a nonlinear income tax, and consumers
allocate their net income xi over n+m consumption goods. Commodities are produced by a linear
technology with labor as the only input to production. Quantities are chosen such that all producer
prices are equal to one.
Let the vector of the ￿rst n commodities consumed by an individual i be denoted by ci =
(c1i;c2i;:::;cni) and the vector of the other m commodities by di = (d1i;d2i;:::;dmi). The con-
sumption of each of the m commodities creates a negative externality, whereas the consumption of
the ￿rst n commodities does not. More precisely an externality is created by the total consumption
of a commodity m, i.e. the level of an externality is given by Ek =
P
i idki, k = 1;:::;m.2 That is,
there are m di￿erent externalities in the model represented by the vector E = (E1;E2;:::;Em). In-
dividuals have identical preferences described by the strictly concave utility function u(ci;di;li;E)
with ￿rst partial derivative being positive with respect to cji and dki and negative with respect
to li and Ek. I restrict the analysis to cases where @u=@Ek < 0 only for expositional reasons
but allowing for positive externalities would not cause any complication. In addition, following
previous work (e.g. Sandmo, 1975), I assume that individuals behave atomistically, i.e. they do
not take into consideration the in￿uence of their own consumption on the level of the externalities.
The individuals’ maximization problem is analyzed in two steps. In a ￿rst step, individuals
allocate a ￿xed amount of net income xi over the consumption goods. Let consumer prices be
denoted by pj = 1 + j for the ￿rst n commodities j = 1;:::;n and by qk = 1 + tk for the other
m commodities k = 1;:::;m. Hence, the government can impose proportional commodity taxes j
and tk, respectively, on each of the n+m commodities. It is well-known that in such a tax system
one tax is redundant, thus without loss of generality 1 is set equal to zero, i.e. p1 = 1. The ￿rst






















2Meade (1952) has termed this type ’atmospheric’ externalities.
3and conditional demand functions
cji = cji(xi;zi;p;q;E); j = 1;:::;n; (2)
dki = dki(xi;zi;p;q;E); k = 1;:::;m: (3)
Observe that in general the demand for all commodities depends on the level of the externalities
Ek, k = 1;:::;m.
In a second step individuals choose their optimal labor supply by maximizing conditional indirect
utility subject to the budget equation xi = zi T(zi), where T(zi) denotes the nonlinear income tax
function. This yields the well-known expression for the implicit marginal income tax rate T0(zi),
which is given by




The objective of the government is to design a tax system, consisting of a general income tax
and proportional commodity taxes, which maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function given
the informational structure of the model and an exogenous revenue requirement. The problem
of ￿nding the optimal income tax schedule can equivalently be stated by determining the optimal
gross and net income bundles xi;zi for each type. Thus, the optimal income tax for the two types of
individuals is determined implicitly as the di￿erence zi  xi, i = L;H. Note that the available tax
instruments are completely determined by the information structure of the model. Since earning
abilities are not observable to the government (only the distribution of types is known), type
speci￿c ￿rst-best lump-sum taxes are not feasible. Therefore the government has to use a general
income tax as a second-best instrument. In addition, consumption is assumed to be observable
only in the aggregate, while individual consumption levels are private information. Thus, type
speci￿c nonlinear commodity taxes are not feasible either.
The utilitarian social welfare function reads
max
xi;zi;2;::;n;t1;::;tm;E1;::;Em
fLvL(xL;zL;p;q;E) + fHvH(xH;zH;p;q;E); (5)
where fL and fH, with fL  fH  0, represent the weights of the two types of individu-
als including the fractions L and H. The agent monotonicity condition is assumed to hold,
meaning that MRSL
zx > MRSH
zx at any vector (x;z), where MRSi
zx is de￿ned as MRSi
zx 
 (@vi=@zi)=(@vi=@xi). This implies that for any income tax function the high-able individual does
4not choose to earn less income than the low-able.
The resource constraint is given by
L(zL   xL) + H(zH   xH) +
n X
j=2
j(LcjL + HcjH) +
m X
k=1
tk(LdkL + HdkH)  g; (6)
i.e. tax revenues have to be raised to ￿nance exogenous public spending g. In addition the
government’s choice of optimal taxes is restricted by a self-selection constraint, which reads
vH(xH;zH;p;q;E)  vH(xL;zL;p;q;E): (7)
It assures that the allocation implemented by the government is such that the H type has no
incentive to mimic or imitate the L type (by working less). The constraint that the L type does
not mimic the H type can be neglected because it is not binding in the optimum, as the analysis is
restricted to cases, where the government wants to redistribute from high- to low-ability persons.
To abbreviate notation indirect utility of the mimicker is denoted by vH[L] and consumption of
the mimicker by cjH[L] and dkH[L]. In addition, the levels of the externalities are taken into




idki; k = 1;:::;m: (8)
The Lagrange multipliers for the resource and the self-selection constraint are denoted by  and
, respectively, and for the constraints concerning the externality levels by k. The ￿rst-order
conditions for the maximization problem are provided in the Appendix.
3 Optimal tax structure
The optimal tax structure can be derived from the ￿rst-order conditions of the social planner’s
maximization problem. Before I present the results for the optimal commodity and income tax
rates, I discuss in more detail the shadow prices of the externalities measured in terms of tax
revenues k=, k = 1;:::;m, as they will be highly relevant for the analysis of the optimal tax
structure later on. This discussion is closely related to the one in Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (1997),
which I generalize for the purposes of this study.





It can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay of an individual i to reduce Ek by one unit.
Note that MWPki is positive as we assumed Ek to be a negative externality. From the ￿rst-order
conditions one can then derive an expression for k= which is displayed in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: In the social optimum the shadow prices of the externalities measured in terms of




































































@Ek 6= 0 for s 6= k, then k= depends on s=.
Proof: The derivation of equation (10) is provided in the Appendix.
The shadow prices k= can be interpreted as the social harm or gain of a speci￿c externality
measured in terms of tax revenues. Lemma 1 states that in general the shadow prices depend on
each other, i.e. the social harm or gain induced by the consumption of commodity k also depends
on the shadow prices of the externalities induced by the consumption of the other commodities s
(s 6= k), at least if Ek a￿ects compensated demand for these commodities. This can be seen from
the last two terms on the RHS of (10).






@Ek ) captures the impact of the level of the externality on compensated demand for com-
modity k. If compensated demand for good k increases (decreases) with Ek, this term is larger
(smaller) than 1. Hence, the shadow price is larger if an increase in the level of the externality
has a positive e￿ect on the demand for the good which generates that externality. The ￿rst-term
6within parenthesis is the marginal willingness to pay of all individuals to avoid the externality. It
can be considered as the direct negative e￿ect of the externality and as its sign is always positive,
it increases the value of the shadow price. Then there is also an e￿ect related to the self-selection
constraint, represented by the second term within parenthesis. The sign of this e￿ect is ambiguous.
It depends on whether the mimicker or the L type has a higher marginal willingness to pay to avoid
the externality. As the only di￿erence between them is labor supply provided the sign depends
on @MWPki=@li R 0. Finally, the two terms in the second line of (10), describe the impact of
the externality on government’s tax revenues. The sign of these e￿ects is again ambiguous, as the
reaction of compensated demand due to a change of Ek can have either sign. Altogether k= can
be positive or negative, although Ek is a negative externality. That is, an increase in the level of the
externality could also generate a social gain. However, the case that an increase of the externality
is socially harmful (k= > 0) appears more plausible because of the direct negative e￿ect.
Now I present the main results on the optimal tax structure. As the focus is on the Pigouvian
role of commodity taxation, preferences are assumed to be weakly separable in labor supply and
consumption. It is well-known from the literature that in the absence of externalities commodity
taxation is not needed in the presence of a nonlinear income tax if preferences are weakly separable
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). Hence, the potential role of commodity taxes in the model is
exclusively to correct for the externalities. It can be shown that the essence of my results does not
depend on the separability of the utility function. 3




























































































3Of course optimal commodity tax rates look di￿erent if commodities are either complements or substitutes with
leisure, as then they contain an additional e￿ect on the self-selection constraint. However, the Pigouvian parts




































































































































The (implicit) solution to this system of equations is given by




; k = 1;:::;m: (14)
It is unique if A is assumed to be non-singular. The optimal tax rates on commodities j = 2;:::;n
remain una￿ected by the externalities, which con￿rms the validity of the ’additivity property’ with
respect to the tax rates j. Hence, given weak separability the optimal tax rates on these ’clean’
commodities are zero. On the other hand the optimal tax rates on the externality-generating
commodities contain a Pigouvian element which is positive if the externality is socially harmful
(k= > 0). Looking at (14) one can see that for each k = 1;:::;m the optimal tk is equal to the
shadow price of commodity k measured in terms of tax revenues. Thus, the ￿rst impression is that
the ’additivity property’, stating that the presence of an externality only alters the tax rate on
that particular good, is still valid. But from Lemma 1 we know that the marginal social damages
of the m externalities depend on each other. Hence, when taxing commodity k one has to take into
account the e￿ects of Ek on the demand for the other externality-generating commodities s(s 6= k)
and if these e￿ects are nonzero the marginal social damages induced by the consumption of these
commodities have an impact on the optimal tk. For example, if the demand for commodity s
increases with Ek this is an additional argument to increase tk (provided s= > 0), since reducing
the level of the externality Ek also reduces the consumption of commodity s, and hence Es.4 Thus,
if there is more than one commodity that generates an externality, the interdependence between
these commodities should be taken into account.
Finally, I present the structure of the optimal income tax schedule. Combining (4) and the FOCs
4Essential for this argument is that demand for commodity k decreases if the price qk increases, because then by
increasing tk one reduces Ek.
8for xi;zi the optimal marginal income tax rates can be derived. They are given by
T0(zH) = 0 (15)









for the L type. One observes immediately that the marginal income tax rates do not depend on
the externalities, i.e. the additivity property remains valid with respect to the income tax as well.
Since the externalities do not a￿ect the income tax schedule the optimal marginal income tax rates
in our model are the same as those in the conventional mixed tax case when weak-separability is
assumed. Thus, for a closer interpretation of these formulas the author refers to e.g. Edwards et





@Ek 6= 0 with s 6= k, the optimal tax rates tk on the externality-generating
commodities depend on all shadow prices s=, s = 1;:::;m, i.e. on the marginal social harm or
gain induced by each of the externality-generating commodities. This violates the ’additivity prop-
erty’ since the condition that an externality only a￿ects the tax rate on that particular good no
longer holds. The optimal tax rates on commodities j = 2;:::;n and the income tax are una￿ected
by the externalities.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I study the optimal income and commodity tax structure in the presence of many
externality-generating commodities, i.e. I drop the assumption made in previous contributions that
there is only one externality-generating commodity. This allows me to study the interdependence
between the externalities and to analyze possible implications for the optimal tax structure. I
￿nd that the income tax and the taxes on the ’clean’ commodities are una￿ected by the external-
ities, con￿rming previous results. On the other hand, the tax rates on the externality-generating
commodities in general depend on the marginal social damage induced by the consumption of all
commodities. Thus, I have shown that the optimal Pigouvian tax rates should not be considered in
isolation separately for each externality, as the interdependence between them is important. This
9extension of the optimal tax design problem in the presence of externalities adds to further realism
of the model, as in reality there are many goods whose consumption causes an externaliy. To get
an idea about the magnitude of the elaborated e￿ect more empirical evidence on the in￿uence of
externality-levels (e.g. of an increase in pollution) on the demand for other externality-generating
commodities is required.
Appendix
First order conditions of the government’s maximization problem
The ￿rst-order condition of the government’s maximization problem with respect to the optimal


























































































































































































































Proof of Lemma 1
































































@xH +  @vH















@xi for j = 2;::;n and s = 1;::;m. Then A8 can
be transformed to equation (10) from the text.
Derivation of the optimal commodity tax rates













































































) = 0: (A9)




@xH from A1 and A3. Observe that due to the assump-





























































k = 1;::;m. A10 and A11 can then be transformed to matrix notation as given by equation 11
from the text.
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